The concept that religion and the state have separate spheres, even though there are many spheres of joint responsibility, was by no means peculiar to the west. In fact, the attempt of demarcating the spheres of the two is much older in India, just as the Indian tradition of the state is much longer in time and also more varied than Europe, on account of the vastly different conditions prevailing in various parts of the country. Thus, there have been old traditions of state formation in many areas, continuation of tribal states in a few and a mixture of the two in some others. The monarchical states existed for a long time side by side with republics (ganatantra). Relations between state and religion varied in these different types of states. Nevertheless, on the basis of historical experience, certain traditions were developed which became the dominant tradition over the length and breadth of the country. There is a general impression that in the dominant Hindu or brahmanical tradition, the state in India was theocratic, or more precisely, that the state was merely meant to serve religious ends and that this implied not merely the superiority of the brahmans, since they alone had access to the religious books, but also that the ruler was bound to heed the precepts of the chief priest, the raj guru.

Two things need to be kept in mind here. First, unlike the Catholic Church, there was no organised Church or hierarchy in Hindu religion, though the brahmans did, as a continuing corporate body, which virtually monopolised knowledge of the sacred books and officiated over the daily rituals, wield an enormous influence out of all proportion to their numbers. The Buddhists and the Jains, and even the Hindus had different religious orders (sangha, math, etc.), but they generally refrained from interfering in state or secular affairs. Second, dharma did not mean a set of beliefs or dogma. As is well known, at the outset, dharma meant the path prescribed by the Vedas. By following this path, and observing the rituals laid down, the gods would be propitiated and society would function properly. But at the outset it was realised that religion itself was not enough to ensure social stability. The brahmanical thinkers, whose writing alone is available to us, rejected the republican form, and favoured monarchy. This tradition is reiterated in the Mahabharat. The story is related thus:-

“Neither Kingship nor King was there in the beginning; neither sceptre (danda) nor the bearer of the sceptre. All people protected one another, by means of righteous conduct (dharma). Thus, while protecting one another by means of righteous conduct, O Bharata, men eventually fell into a state of spiritual lassitude. Then delusion overcame them. Men were thus overpowered by infatuation. O leader of men, on account of the delusion of understanding, their sense of righteous conduct was lost. Then the gods approached Vishnu, the lord of creatures, and said “Indicate to us that one person among mortals who alone is worthy of the highest eminence.” Then the blessed lord God Narayana reflected, and brought forth an illustrious mind-born son, called Virajas who became the first king.” There was, however, a second, more secular tradition regarding the origin of monarchy where the intervention of the gods was not considered necessary. This is reflected in both brahmanical and Buddhist writings. The Buddhist writers put it as follows- “...the people gathered together and lamented, saying: ‘Evil ways are rife among the people—theft, censure, false speech, and punishment have appeared among us. Let us choose one man from among us, to dispense wrath, censure, and banishment when they are right and proper, and give him a share of our rice in return. So they chose the most handsome... .attractive and capable among them and invited him to dispense anger, censure, and banishment. He consented and did so, and they gave him a share of their rice.”

These two traditions, one emphasizing the divine character of monarchy and its religious purport, and the second its democratic origin based on social contract and its secular purpose, contend and interact with each other. The secular tradition of monarchy is expressed most clearly in the Arthashastra of Kautilya, which is ascribed to the 2nd Century B.C. It says:- “the sceptre (danda), i.e. government, is the means of acquisition and preservation of philosophy, the Vedas and the economics. The science treating the effective power of the sceptre is the science of polity (dandaniti). It conduces to the acquisition of what is not acquired, the preservation of what has been acquired, growth of what has been preserved, and the distribution among working people of what has grown. It is on it (the science of polity) that the proper functioning of society (lit. the world) depends ... .Of the three ends of human life, material means is, verily, the most important.” So, says Kautilya, “on material gain depends the realisation of dharma and kama.” The secular tradition of the state was sought to be absorbed by the brahmans, but it always remained a distinct and separate tradition. The religious tradition underwent many changes. Under Ashoka, who ruled over the largest empire before the rise of the Turkish and Mughal Empires, dhamma or righteousness had more a social than a religious character. Thus, in a pillar inscription he says:— “...
The Ceremonies of Righteousness (dhamma) are of great profit—these are the good treatment of slaves and servants, respect for elders, self-mastery in one’s relations with living beings, gifts to brahmans and ascetics, and so on. But for their success everyone—fathers, mothers, brothers, masters, friends, acquaintances and neighbours—must agree ‘These are good’.” (Ninth Rock Edict)

Before Buddhism receded from India, many of its features, such as respect for life or non-violence, attention to the daily woes of the people (daridranarayan) etc, were quietly absorbed into Brahmanical thinking. At the same time, the four-fold varna system, and the special privileges of the brahmans were re-emphasized. According to the Dharmnshastras, the prime duty of a ruler was to protect the subjects, enforce the observance of the code of the Varvlashrama dharma, to punish the wicked, and to administer justice. Thus, apart from secular duties, the religious obligation of the ruler largely revolved around the protection and upholding of the four-fold varna system. The preservation of the varna system, in turn, was sought to be identified with social stability. Anyone who attacked and criticised the system was, therefore, to be regarded as an enemy of the state and society. This implied also that the ruler was duty-bound to suppress all heretical and heterodox movements which opposed the varna system and the privileges of the brahmans. To what extent these precepts were followed by the rulers in practice is not clear. Thus, Manu’s injunctions that if a shudra recited the Vedas, his tongue should be cut off or if he listened to the Vedas, molten lead should be poured into his-ears, do not ever seem to have been acted upon.

It did, however, imply acceptance and even sanctification of social discrimination, including relegating a sizeable section of the population—the outcastes (anirvasita) to virtually sub-human conditions of existence. While social discrimination was accepted, religious discrimination was not. The sacred texts do not mention anywhere instances on the basis of which a king would be justified in discriminating between different sections of his subjects on the basis of their religious beliefs. This was clearly set out by Ashoka in another of his pillar inscriptions. He says :- “The Beloved of the Gods...honours members of all sects, whether ascetics or householders, by gifts and various honours. But he does not consider gifts and honours as important as the furtherance of the essential message of all sects.” “Whoever honours his own sect and disparages another man’s, whether from blind loyalty or with the intention of showing his own sect in a favourable light, does his own sect the greatest possible harm. Concord is best, with each hearing and respecting the other’s teachings. It is the wish of the Beloved of the Gods that members of all sects should be learned and should teach virtue.” (Twelfth Rock Edict) The great Harsha, at the time of the five-year assemblies at Prayag, worshipped Siva, Vishnu and the Sun, and gave rich gifts to the Buddhists and to the brahmans. In general, a distinction was made between religious duties as prescribed by the Dharmashastras and kingly duties or raj-dharma. The outcome of raj-dharma was raj-niti or polity, which, according to commentators such as Medhatithi, even over-rode the Dharmashastras if there was a conflict between the two.

Thus, neither the secular nor the religious traditions imply the subordination of the ruler to the religious or clerical elements. An unjust ruler was not one who failed in his religious duties, but who failed to protect his subjects. Thus, kingly ideals were given primacy over everything else. It did not, of course, imply that the rulers were anti-religious or that there was apparent conflict between kingly duties and the provisions of the sacred books. It meant that while recognizing broad common objectives, the king was left virtually free to administer and run the state according to his lights, and with the help of his advisers (mantris). But the brahmans had to be given honour and respect and propitiated with grants of land and other gifts. State and religion in the medieval period The Turks who entered India as rulers towards the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th centuries, had vastly different traditions from the Indians. They had a Prophet, a Revealed Book, and a dogma to which they were strongly attached, and had developed their own traditions of state and government. However, the character of the state as it ultimately developed under the aegis of the Turks, was not different in substance to the one which we have described above. The Islamic theory of the state had passed through many phases before the entry of the Turks into India. The earlier theory of the unity of religious and secular duties in the person of the Imam had been replaced by one in which a secular ruler, the Sultan, could be considered a legitimate Muslim King if he strictly followed the injunctions of the Holy Law, the sharia.

Al-Mawardi (d. 1058), one of the leading exponents of this new theory, argued that a ruler who seized power could be considered legitimate if he accepted the nominal authority of the Caliph, and undertook to rule according to the Holy Law and defend Muslim territory. However, in India, the Muslim jurists came face to face with problems which were completely different from those facing the Muslim states outside India. It was recognised early that the Hindus were deeply attached to their faiths, and that it would be impossible to convert them. Giving them the option of “Islam or death”, as urged by some of the Law Givers, would, therefore, have meant destabilisation of the Muslim state in India.

This reality was recognised and right at the time 6f the Arab conquest of Sindh (8th century), the Hindus had been given the option of paying jizyah, and accorded the status of zimmis or protected people. Much of the subsequent debate in India regarding the position of the Hindus had, therefore, little substance or was designed to influence the policy of state. Thus, many of the writings on the subject ate little more than an affirmation of the orthodox faith and affiliations of the writer. A fresh departure from this position was made by the historian, Ziauddin Barani, who tried to reconcile theory with the reality. Barani affirmed that a truly Islamic state could not be set up in India, but only one which had the outward trappings of a Muslim state. He called such a state as one based on Jahandari or worldly considerations, as distinct from one based on faith or din-panahi. The noted modern historian, Professor Mohammad Habib, summarised the position as follows :

“They (the Sultans) paid a lip homage to the Shariat and admitted their sintulness it they were unable to enforce any of its provisions; they kept the state-controlled Mullahs disciplined and satisfied; over the whore field of administration, concerning which the Shariat is silent or nearly silent, they made their own laws, if the traditional customs of the people were against Shariat, they allowed them to over-ride the Shariat under the designation of Urf. Thus state laws called Zawabit grew under the protection of monarchy. If these laws violated the Shariat, the principle of necessity or of Istihsan (the public good) could be quoted in their favour. And the back of the Shariat was broken for the primary reason that it has provided no means for its own development.”1 1. Muhammad Habib in Introduction to Ziauddin Barani’s Fatawa-i-Jahandari, tr. Afsar Jahan Begum, Kitab Mahal, AUahabad, n.d., pp. 136-37. Even after the Delhi Sultanate had been consolidated rind the religious rights of non-Muslim population accorded wide recognition, two contentious questions arose: (i) the extent of the privileges of the clergy or the ulema. (ii) the precise share and role of the Hindus in running the state. Regarding the first, the situation varied from ruler to ruler. While no ruler allowed the clergy to dictate state policy, they were given an honoured position. Only Muhammad Tughlaq refused to give them any special privileges. Those who violated state laws were punished or put to death like anyone else. But his successor, Feroz, compromised and propitiated the clergy.

The problem of the role of the Hindus in running the state was more difficult, for it involved, first and foremost, the privileged position of the Turkish nobility.