COMMENT

Summit Bungling Unpardonable

The Agra Summit has left the country very confused. What is even more disconcerting is that even the Prime Minister, the Government and the Minister of External Affairs seem confused. They are not able to resolve this dilemma as to whether this Summit was a success or a failure.

The External Affairs Minister first said : "In the Summit, we have made progress. We have embarked on a journey which is going to lead us to a destination called peace." Two days later, he disowned Agra as 'a bad dream'. Then, a day later, it was announced that the Foreign Minister has accepted Mr. Sattar's invitation to visit Pakistan, "to pick up the threads from General Musharraf's visit", which has just been dismissed by the Indian Foreign Office as 'a bad dream'.

The Congress party and other Opposition parties extended full support to the government. As Shri S. Jaipal Reddy very eloquently said that "we almost gave them a blank cheque but they left us with a huge overdraft, and that is the balance-sheet of Agra." The result is that we are left wondering about peace in South Asia. Was this another Lahorian "turning point in history in South Asia"? Has this placed us on the "high" road to peace or can it lead to another Kargil?

The Government has launched many initiatives but each time we have regressed instead of going forward. We have tried to sprint but we have lost the very ground that we were standing on. Twice, the Home Minister, with great fanfare launched what he called proactive initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir and the result was an increase in militancy.

When the Prime Minister, Shri Vajpayee, took the bus to Lahore, we warned, "Take care before you leave or else you may seriously damage the future". We were not against a dialogue with Pakistan. We fully support it. As in Lahore, in Agra too, the Government have rushed totally unprepared and now we know the consequences.

After the Kargil the Government said 'No more dialogue with a dictator. No talks unless Pakistan stops encouraging cross-border terrorism'. But even as the Government ranted and raved about cross-border terrorism, it sent our esteemed Foreign Minister to escort terrorists to their freedom in Kandahar. What an unprecendented spectacle that was. We hung our heads in disbelief and then the Foreign Minister praises the Taliban, the very force that had connived with the hijackers. Our naivety and faith in human kindness is indeed touching!

The proactive approach in Jammu and Kashmir which has been made proactive not once but twice, was suddenly jettisoned. The Government took an about-turn to announce a unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir and then promptly went into a deep slumber treating the ceasefire almost as an end in itself instead of a means to an end - the end being the objective of establishing peace through dialogue. This euphoria did not last even six months. The ceasefire was suddenly called off. The end of the ceasefire almost coincided with the invitation to General Musharraf. We have now completed the full circle. We are now willing to talk to the military dictator who is still supporting terrorism. With this track record, we now approach Agra.

We are extremely diasppointed that Agra was a failure. We wished it success. But, we are not surprised that it was a failure. We find this Goverment constantly whistling in the dark, waiting for some manna from heaven to deliver. Agra was one of the rare Summits which will go down in history as one where confusion on the very agenda was allowed to prevail till the eve of the Summit. Should not some prior, behind the scene diplomatic activities and efforts have been made to ensure that a broad agenda was drawn up which would suit both the countries?

I was reading today an interesting article by my colleague Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar in which he talks about Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China. He says : "The first : to push an eyeball-to-eyeball military confrontation with the Chinese army at Sumdorongchu where we had apprehended a Chinese intrusion. It was the Chinese who blinked."

He further says : "Then came the February 1987 grant of full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, notwithstanding the anticipated squawk from Beijing, indeed with every intention of signalling the People's Republic that every inch of Arunachal was Indian, whatever the Chinese might think.

Therefore, and only thereafter, were dates discussed for the visit to China. It was no coincidence that visits to both China and Pakistan were scheduled in the same month of December 1988. Everything was prepared down to the last detail before Shri Rajiv Gandhi embarked for Beijing. Everything, therefore, went without a glitch.

"The one thing not planned for was Deng Xiaoping's handshake before the cameras of the world in the Great Hall of the People. It went on and on and on. Every television viewer everywhere in the world was informed that the era of confrontation was over, the era of cooperation had begun. A decade later, the reverberations of that handshake are still echoing in the chancelleries of the world. This is what summit's between adversaries should be about."

If Pakistan had refused to look at an agenda, the dates should not have been finalised. What was the urgency to go into the summit without a structure, without an agenda? This gives rise to much speculation. Was there pressure from other quarters? Was it to deflect from the dismal failure of the ceasefire? Was it to divert attention from the disastrous results in five State elections or was it Tehelka? I do not subscribe to that. I cannot imagine that the Government would be forced to gamble with the foremost challenge that we face in our foreign policy.

It is absolutely shocking that after one day of the Prime Minister's deliberations, after two one-to-one meetings, we hear General Musharraf telling us that militants from across the border are not terrorists, but freedom fighters. What remarkable intermission! In a summit that is initiated by us, our own core issue is rubbished by the other Head of State. Did we have to reach Agra to discover that Pakistan was not willing to talk about cross border terrorism?

The very absence of the agenda allowed General Musharraf to take far more advantage of the Agra summit than we could. The entire nation wanted to know how far India had gone on what was called very eloquently the "high road to peace". Whereas on the one side the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Spokesman, Information Secretary and PIO were always available for formal and informal briefings, the members of the Indian Delegation seem to have suddenly disappeared into their burroughs. Sound diplomacy must be backed by sound communications and media strategy. This is crucial to diplomatic success.

General Musharraf utilises the media instrument to great effect. The television and newspapers churned out reams of footage and columns of what the Pakistan position was. At the end, we are all familiar with the Pakistan position. But what was the Indian position, what was the Indian point of view, what did the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister want from the Summit, it was difficult to know. It is because we hardly got a glimpse of the heroic duo. Only the heroine made a brief guest appearance - I do not know on whose invitation - and created a bedlam.

The only way we could cope with General Musharraf's breakfast show was to release hon'ble Prime Minister's remarks made 24 hours earlier. How pathetic! We simply did not have a strategy or any fallback options to retrieve our position. Even the Indian journalists were forced to turn to the Pakistani officials to figure out what was going on. I have great respect for Shrimati Sushma Swaraj's oratory, eloquence and articulations. But why was she allowed to speak when it is an established practice that only the External Affairs Minister or the Foreign Secretary or an authorised official are there to state positions?

This is what a respectable magazine like The Economist had to say : "It appears that the two leaders agreed that the Declaration should just refer to terrorism. But the hawks on the Indian side, apparently led by Shri L.K. Advani, the Home Minister, insisted on adding cross-border terrorism in order to nail down Pakistan's responsibility for allowing Islamic militants to cross into India from its territory. This was the deal-breaker for the General".

All through, General Musharraf was clearly sending signals in all his pronouncements that someone in the Cabinet was sabotaging the Declaration. This was his attempt all the time. In his recent Press Conference in Islamabad, he is so effusive in his praise for Shri Vajpayee and Shri Jaswant Singh that it is almost used as if to indicate that the Summit has not failed because of them, because they were in agreement. The subtle indication, or I may say, not so subtle indication, is that there were some other's behind the scene.

Both leaders admit that 90 percent of the time was spent on Jammu and Kashmir. Where there is the time for our core concerns? General Musharraf told the Press conference : "Can there be a solution without resolving Kashmir? No. Certainly not. Simla and Lahore do not recognise the centrality of Kashmir. Therefore, they are hardly relevant." He goes on to say that militants are freedom fighters and indigenous and have nothing to do with cross-border terrorism. Then, he asserts that there was progress and they almost reached an agreement. In fact, chairs were placed according to him, and the differences were minimal. Then, what happens? He does not know. He does not want to comment on it. One version, of course, doing the rounds is that we ultimately rejected our own draft. That is again rumour and I would not like to place credence in it.

Shri Vajpayee himself in his statement says that we did achieve a degree of understanding. It would mean that the centrality of the J&K issue had been agreed to, and, it would mean that our core issue of cross-border terrorism had been relegated. What is the truth? This what the country wants to know and that is why we find General Musharraf all the way through seems to be praising Shri Vajpayee and his open-mindedness. In effect, he is trying to say that they both had agreed - somebody else had not - to these things and if they had agreed, then it had to be on these two premises; otherwise, he would have walked out. I am not the one saying that this is factually correct. But the Prime Minister had said in his musings from Kerala.

"In our search for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem, both in its external and internal dimensions, we shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Rather, we shall be bold and innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity for the entire South Asian region. In this search, the sole light that will guide us is our commitment to peace, justice and vital interests of the nation." This is what General Musharraf keeps talking about in his Press conference. Then, the Pakistan High Commissioner decides that it is his turn to speak. He says in a Press interview on the 19th July : "A working understanding has definitely been reached to move on nine areas, three of these areas, Kashmir, CBMs and narcotics, have been selected to be dealt with at political level. Thanks to the understanding reached at Agra, Kashmir now gets the first place."

What is to be noted is that there is no mention of cross-border terrorism among the subjects to be dealt with at political level, according to the Pakistan High Commission's version. Is not even the Lahore formulation agreeable? The Lahore formulation says : "reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menance."

Sir, Simla was the bedrock of bilateralism and Lahore was an extension. Both Simla and Lahor ementioned Jammu and Kashmir as just of the issues. Were they close to signing or agreeing to elevate Kashmir as the prime issue with no reference to cross-border terrorism? Would this allow for a future Pakistan rejection of agreements arrived at Simla and Lahore? Since this was against the politica consensus, the Government should explain if it came close to unilaterally breaking this consensus. Let us know the areas of agreement and the areas of disagreement. Are General Musharraf and Shri Qazi, High Commissio9ner, misleading us? How was the Pakistan version freely allowed to gain currency? The Government must tell the truth and take the nation into confidence and build a consensus.

As far as the Summit is concerned, we lost before the Summit, we lost during the Summit and we have lost after the Summit. We lost before the Summit because General Musharraf did not want an agenda. This was his ploy. If there had been a structured agenda, he could not have kept merely pushing 'Kashmir' - Jammu and Kashmir - in the discussions. He did not want an agenda. We gave in. We lost during the Summit because they were more articulate and more communicative. We have lost after the Summit because of the international impression that the Indian Cabinet is divided, and that the country was confused. I hope we are communicating now.

A Summit between two Heads of State is a double edged weapon. If planned with rigour and panache, it has the potential of bringing the most hostile nations together. But if messed up, it can widen the gulf, create gaping chasms and unleash forces that are vigorous in violence.

Agra has pushed us backwards and not forward. Look at the heinous attacks that are taking place for the last three days. Thirty-three people have lost their lives in Doda and Sheshnag. Killings are taking place as a direct result of the hamhanded handling by this Government. This Summit has failed and indirectly encouraged the militants. The blood of innocent people was split at Pahalgam last year. The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, while extolling General Musharraf, have announced an acceleration in their activities and Pakistan is bound to encourage them. Rather than weakening cross -border terrorism, the failure of the Summit has strengthened it. But General Musharraf regards these barbaric terrorist acts as a part of an indigenous freedom struggle.

Dealing with Pakistan is dealing with very hard-nosed diplomats on whom poetry and sentiments have little effect in the final analysis. One cannot just overlook General Musharraf's career background. He is reputed to have had associations in his early days with the Tabligh Jamat and Lashkar-e-Toiba. He was the Force Commander of the Northern Area that covered the entire operations in northern India, including Siachen. He has moved into Government, hard-liners from the Zia regime. This is the same General Musharraf of the Kargil tapes that were leaked out.

In a telephonic conversation from China with General Aziz he had said, and this is a taped conversation that was leaked. He said, "the militants are like a tap in Pakistan's hands, they can turn it on or they can turn it off whenever they want." Then where is the meeting point?

I would just like to suggest certain steps that should be taken. I agree that great care should be taken before going to Pakistan. By all means, have meetings in the margin at the United Nations or at SAARC. Their officials should meet, their Foreign Ministers should meet. The Prime Minister should not go to Pakistan without defining the structured agenda and without being fully prepared. The Government should build a consensus on the approach that to be adopted, a consensus within and outside the Government. We should put-forth our views on Jammu and Kashmir with conviction. It is an integral part of India and there can be no compromise on this. Pakistan's abetment of cross-border terrorism must stop.

A most important issue is the nuclear one. How much emphasis has been laid on this? This issue must be raised if and when the Prime Minister goes to Pakistan along with other most vital issues because two nuclear powers have a very heavy responsibility. Even when the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States were eyeball-to-eyeball, their discussions on the nuclear issue, their dialogue never ceased. Therefore, Nuclear Risk Reduction measures must be put into place and they should be treated independently whether your talks on the other issues succeed or fail. There should be a different track for this. I would urge the Government to put in place a machinery which can meet from time to time, exchange views, talk about safety measures and create a greater comprehension, at least, on this particular issue because the whole sub-continent is interested, all our neighbours are interested.

I assure that the Congress Party will always support any genuine initiative this Government wants to take for peace with Pakistan. The Government must take care, however, to be prepared. There must be no repetition of Agra because the cost of failure is too high and can imperil many precious lives. Undoubtedly, there is yearning for peace amongst the people of India and the people of Pakistan. We cannot continually frustrate these high sentiments far beyond a point. If frustration sets in, it would breed cynicism and that could convert into a yearning for war and what a result of that can be between two nuclear nations. It is too horrendous to envisage.

So, how does the final Agra balance-sheet 2001 compare with the situation in 1998? First, Jammu and Kashmir has virtually been portrayed wrongly or rightly as the central issue. Secondly, Pakistan has now described cross-border terrorists as freedom fighters. Thirdly, they have virtually declared Simla and Lahore as redundant. Fourthly, militancy has greatly increased. Fifthly, the Pakistan High Commissioner had the gall to declare on Indian TV, on Indian soil - and I commend and compliment Shrimati Sushma Swaraj for the way she took him on - that he does not recognise the leader of the duly elected Jammu and Kashmir Government, Shri Farooq Abdullah as the Chief Minister. The High Commissioner is saying this on Indian soil on Indian TV. It is not a balance-sheet that can make any Government proud and the Agra type, half-baked, ill-prepared exercise has only aggravated the situation.

Congress is prepared to support the Government in a well thought-out and strategic peace effort but such naive and amateurish efforts cannot earn the respect or support of the country. Our whole-hearted support for any peace effort is always available but for Heaven's sake, let us be more meticulous, more prudent in the conduct of our foreign policy.

The Government has done some harm to the credibility and the image of our country. The Indian political establishment and the people would support the right overtures of peace with its neighbour. However, they would react firmly and decisively if chicanery is dished out in the garb of peace and that is what one has to guard against when one talks to Pakistan.

(Based on Mr. Madhavrao Scindia's speech in the Lok Sabha on 24th July, 2001)